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POINI I. I HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PERSONS 
NAMED AS DEFENDANTS WERE SHIELDED BY QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY. 
The Complaint in paragraphs 13 and 14 alleges clear!) c nl law en til liny 
Plaintiffs to the interest on money depos i compensation. As 
stated n , uiiuu^ > ..uin *m±UiLSjL±Au&, 858 P.2d 1372 (1993) at 1378 [10,11], 
"Because it is an affirmative defense, the issue of qualified immunity arises aiu., u;^ 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under § 198. i anuvv v. l;itzgerak: 
800,815,1025 0 . 2 / 2 / . >?\ , u hi 'J W • l< he trial court cannot decide 
t h i s iMstit, o n ,ii i Hi* III I ' ' (liKiijir" 
In Harlow, the United States Supreme Court held at page 815: 
[5] Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affimiative deleft <iuu inaM 
pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 US 635, o4 1. Ed 572, , „\; 
S Ct 1920 (1980). Decisions of this Court have established that the "good faith" 
defense has both an "objective" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element 
involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic, unquestioned 
constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland, 420 US 308, 322, 43 I, Ed 2d 214, \o 
S Ct 992 (1975). The subjective component refers to "permissible intentions." 
Ibid. Characteristically the Court has defined these elements by identifying the 
circumstances in which qualified immunity would not be available. Referring 
both to the objective and subjective elements, we have held that qualified 
immunity would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have 
known that the action he took within his sphen >l official responsibility would 
violate the constitutional rights of the [plaint if!, oi if'.o took the action with the 
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injiiry . . 
." Ibid, (emphasis added). 
A state can act only through persoi nendment to the 
United State i i IISIMIMMMI has hern litiil to shield a state from suits by its citizens, the 
2 
state has no immunity where it has consented to be sued. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida. 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996) held that the state in that case had not consented to be 
sued. 
The State of Utah consented to be sued under Article I Section 22, Utah 
Constitution: "Private Property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation." Also the State has no immunity from suit under the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, the last phrase of which provides: "nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 
As noted hereinafter, the constitutional provisions are self executing. 
A state and its employees are "persons" under 42 USC §1983 where they can be 
sued by consent or otherwise. Will v. Michigan Dept. Of State Police et aL 491 US 58, 
105 L. Ed. 2d 45, (1989) 109 S. Ct. 2304 at 105, L. Ed 2d at 55-56. Subsequently Hafer 
v. Melo. 116 L. Ed. 2d 301 held that: 
To be sure, imposing personal liability on state officers may hamper their 
performance of public duties. But such concerns are properly addressed within 
the framework of our personal immunity jurisprudence. See Forrester v White, 
supra, at 223, 98 L Ed 555, 108 S Ct 538. Insofar as respondents seek damages 
against Hafer personally, the Eleventh Amendment does not restrict their ability to 
sue in federal court. 
We hold that state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are "persons" 
within the meaning of §1983 solely by virtue of the "official" nature of their acts. 
However, the Plaintiffs herein are not pursuing §1983 relief, both because the trial 
court refused to take jurisdiction over §1983 claims, even though he volunteered that the 
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Defendants were not persons under §1983, and because the claims under §1983 are not 
constitutionally self-executing and may require compliance with the notice provisions of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Plaintiffs are pursuing §1983 claims in the 
Federal Court. 
In this appeal, the Plaintiffs are pursuing their interest entitlement. 
In all of the federal cases cited, there was no mention of immunity of the state in 
suits to recover interest earned on the principal owed and the states were ordered to make 
interest payments. Where the state has no immunity, the employees and agencies of the 
state have no immunity in such causes. 
POINT II. ARTICLE I SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND 
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES ARE SELF-EXECUTING AND NO LEGISLATION CAN LIMIT 
THE RIGHTS THEREUNDER. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 
(Utah 1990) stated at page 630, "The question of whether Article I section 22 is self-
executing involves the issue of whether the constitutional provision requires legislative 
enactment to be enforced by the Courts." The answer to this question is stated at page 
635 after a review of decisions. It states, "In sum, Article I section 22 needs no 
legislation to activate it." The self-executing status of Article I section 22 is reaffirmed 
in Hamblin v. Clearfield City, 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1990) at 1136 citing Colman. 
In Bennett v. Bow Vallev Development Corp.. 797 P2d 419 (Utah 1990), the 
claim of the plaintiff for damages under Article I section 22 of the Utah Constitution and 
4 
in violation of Amendment V of the United States Constitution, was remanded to the trial 
court for factual determination because the trial court decided the case on a motion to 
dismiss. The Supreme Court stated, "We express no opinion on whether timely notice 
must be given of'taking and damaging property' claims arising after 1987 enactment, 
since that issue is not before us." 
Defendants/Appellees cite Hall v. Utah State Dept. Of Corrections. 24 P. 3rd 958 
(Utah 2001) as requiring notice of the claim under the Whistleblower Act. No self-
executing constitutional provisions were involved. The Court made no reference to 
Colman. Hamblin or Bennett and that decision was wholly based upon a statutory right. 
Also, in Bott v. Deland. 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996), the Supreme Court stated that 
"unnecessary rigor" treatment of an inmate in violation of Article I Section 9 of the Utah 
Constitution provides a basis for an award of damages if it is a self-executing provision 
of the constitution and concluded at page 737 [10], "Article I section 9 is a self executing 
provision." No mention was made of governmental immunity. 
The legislature has no power to diminish a constitutional self-executing provision. 
The rule is stated in Hale v. Bohannon. 241 P.2d 4, Supreme Court of California in 
Bank, at page 11 as follows: 
[17] There is a clear limitation, however, upon the power of the legislature to 
regulate the exercise of a constitutional right. As stated in Chesney v. Byram, 15 
Cal. 2d 460,464, 101 P.2d 1106, 1108, "'all such legislation must be subordinate 
to the constitutional provisions, and in furtherance of its purpose, and must not in 
any particular attempt to narrow or embarrass it.'" The application of section 395 
to actions against corporations would narrow and embarrass the constitutional 
5 
provision materially by reducing in number the possible counties for trial of the 
action. 
Also 16 Am Jur 2d 572, Constitutional Law section 141 provides: 
The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not 
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in 
harmony with the constitution and further the exercise of constitutional right and 
make it more available. Thus, even in the case of a constitutional provision which 
is self-executing, the legislature may enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of 
the powers directly granted by the constitution; legislation may be enacted to 
facilitate the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its 
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured 
or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of 
the right. And, even though a provision states it is self-executing, some legislative 
action may be necessary to effectuate its purposes. But legislative authority to 
provide the method of exercising a constitutional power exists only where the 
constitutional provisions themselves do not provide the manner and means and 
methods for executing the powers therein conferred. Procedure prescribed in a 
self-executing provision must be followed to the exclusion of that prescribed by 
statute, and failure to comply with the provisions of a statute which differ from 
those in the constitutional provision is not a defect. 
It is clear that legislation which would defeat or even restrict a self-executing 
mandate of the constitution is beyond the power of the legislature. Also, the 
legislature is neither required nor permitted to enact laws purporting to confer 
rights in excess of and different from those contemplated by the constitution. A 
liability imposed by a self-executing provision is absolute and not subject to 
legislative enlargement or lessening or restriction as to manner of enforcement. 
Since, as shown in Colman and Hamblin, Article I section 22 was self-executing before 
the 1987 notice requirement, the constitutional provisions needed no legislative 
enlargement or lessening and the notice requirement is inapplicable. 
Constitutional provisions are limitations on legislative power, as held by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451 (Utah 
6 
1985). Kennecott held that the power to assess mines originates in the Utah Constitution 
Article XIII section 11, and the Legislature cannot diminish that power by allowing 
courts to adjust mining assessments. (Comment [8] at 457). 
FEDERAL CASES 
The United States Supreme Court has declared that constitutional provisions are 
self-executing. In San Diego Gas & Electric Cp. V. San Diego, 450 US 621, 67 L Ed 2d 
551,101 S. Ct. 1287, the court at page 579, cited the Webb's Fabulous Pharmacy case as 
holding that the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is made applicable to 
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. We quote from that decision from page 
574: 
The language of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the "tak[ing]" of private 
property for "public use" without payment of "just compensation." As soon as 
private property has been taken, whether through formal condemnation 
proceedings, occupancy, physical invasion, or regulation, the landowner has 
already suffered a constitutional violation, and '"the self-executing character of 
the constitutional provision with respect to compensation,'" United States v 
Clarke, 45 us 253, 257, 63 L Ed 2d 373, 100 S Ct 1127 (1980), quoting 6 J. 
Sackman, Nichols' Law of Eminent Domain §25.41 (rev 3d ed 1980), is triggered. 
This Court has consistently recognized that the just compensation requirement in 
the Fifth Amendment is not precatory: once there is a "taking," compensation 
must be awarded. In Jacobs v United States, 290 US 13, 78 L Ed 142, 54 S Ct 26, 
96 ALR 1 (1933), for example, a Government dam project creating intermittent 
overflows onto petitioners' property resulted in the "taking" of a servitude. 
Petitioners brought suite against the Government to recover just compensation for 
the partial "taking." Commenting on the nature of the landowners' action, the 
Court observed: 
"The suits were based on the right to recover just compensation for property 
taken by the United States for public use in the exercise of its power of 
eminent domain. That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that 
7 
condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the right was asserted 
in suits by the owners did not change the essential nature of the claim. The 
form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth 
Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to pay was 
not necessary. Such a promise was implied because of the duty to pay imposed 
by the Amendment." Id., at 16, 78 L Ed 142, 54 S Ct 26, 96 ALR 1. 
At page 11. 
[6] If the Government pays the owner before or at the time the property is taken, 
no interest is due on the award. See Danforth v United States, 308 US, at 284, 84 
L Ed 240, 60 S Ct 231. Such a mode of compensation is not constitutionally 
mandated; the Fifth Amendment does not forbid the Government to take land and 
pay for it later. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 US 380, 400-403, 40 L Ed 188, 16 S Ct 43 
(1895). But if disbursement of the award is delayed, the owner is entitled to 
interest thereon sufficient to ensure that he is placed in as good a position 
pecuniarily as he would have occupied if the payment had coincided with the 
appropriation. 
(Emphasis added). 
Security and Olson were not allowed to withdraw the principal deposited by 
UDOT until all other defendants disclaimed, at which time the trial courts authorized the 
clerk to make payment of the principal but denied payment of interest, subject to the right 
of Olson and Security to pursue any other remedy available including appeal. Olson and 
Security are now pursuing their other reserved and entitled remedies. 
CONCLUSION 
Since discovery has not been allowed, it is not known which of the Defendants are 
holding the interest entitlement of the Plaintiffs. The cause should be remanded to the 
trial court to determine which Defendants are withholding the interest due Plaintiffs and 
to order payment thereof to the Plaintiffs. In the event the amount of interest is not 
8 
separately determinable, the Plaintiffs are entitled to interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
or federal post judgment interest rate as of January 1st of each year. 
DATED this 2^ day of November, 2001. 
Respectfully submitted. 
/ \ George K. Fadel 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Appellants respectfully request permission for oral argument, 
-' GEORGE K.1 FADEL 
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